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We nd evidence supporting the hypothesis that countries at times misreport their eco-
nomic data in a strategic manner. Among those suspected are countries with xed exchange
rate regimes, high negative net foreign asset positions or negative current account balances,
which corroborates the intuition developed with a simple economic model. We also nd that
countries with bad institutional quality rankings and those in Africa, Middle East, Eastern
Europe and Latin America release economic data of questionable veracity. Our evidence calls
for models with public signals to consider strategic misinformation and for establishing inde-
pendent statistical agencies to assure the delivery of high quality economic data.
JEL codes: F31, F32, F33, F34, D82
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\I almost died when I had to pretend for 1 1/2 years [...] as if we were governing. Instead,
we lied in the morning, we lied in the evening. [...] It was absolutely clear that what we were
saying was not true... And all this time we have done nothing for four years. Nothing. [...]
No country in Europe has acted as brazenly as we did. [...] The moment of truth will come
swiftly. It was divine intervention, the abundance of cash in the world economy and hundreds
of tricks { you obviously don't need to know about { which helped us survive so far."
| Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany in a speech to his party's MPs on 26 May,
2006.
\Our rst order of business is transparency everywhere. We are recording the real situation
in cooperation with the Bank of Greece. To put a nal end to the obscurity of nances, the
statistics service will become truly independent."
| Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou's speech in the Greek parliament, 16 October
2009.
We would like to thank Evren Ors, Romain Ranci ere, Tristan Tomala and the participants at the ESSEC-HEC-
INSEAD-PSE Workshop on Financial Economics for helpful comments. All remaining errors are ours.
yThis research was carried out within the INRIA project CLASSIC hosted by Ecole normale sup erieure and
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1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom has it that governments may lie strategically to the public about economic
data which they collect and provide. Some anecdotal examples may be the accusations of Greece or
Italy of tinkering with their budget decit gures before joining the Eurozone. Argentina has been
suspected of understating ination gures since mid{2007. The Hungarian government, according
to its prime minister in a statement that leaked out, lied to the general public about the state of the
economy to win the elections in 2006. China is believed to embellish its GDP growth numbers. Even
the United States came under scrutiny of the market after GDP growth revisions were consistently
negative in the crisis that started in 2008.1 At times governments are caught red-handed (Hungary),
but most of the time it is simply unclear whether the data that is provided to the public is just
inaccurate (because of, say, measurement errors or bad data collection methods) or suers from
deliberate alterations. In some cases, misinforming economic agents may bring tangible (possibly
short-term) gains for a government; for example, Argentina by misstating ination gures avoided
paying out higher interest on government bonds indexed to ination (which constituted in fact a
partial default) and raising the wages in the public sector. Greece enjoyed lower borrowing rates
(close to Germany's) on its government debt because of its Eurozone membership and because
investors did not know the entire extent of Greek budget troubles.
In this paper we use a statistical test based on the distribution of rst digits of economic
accounting data (also known as Benford's law) to test whether countries falsify the economic gures
that they report or not.2 Benford's distribution of the rst digits arises naturally for processes with
exponential growth; that is, in applications, for many economic data due to ination or economic
growth. It is preserved under multiplication by a common factor, so will survive conversions
into dierent currencies. Also, this distribution arises when many dierent economic processes
are considered together. For these reasons, economic data stemming from many countries should
adhere to Benford's law, and any deviations from Benford's distribution may ag data reporting
irregularities. Before putting our data to test, we develop a simple model that gives us insights
about why and when countries would strategically misinform investors (economic agents). Our
story is simple: a country may want to hide the state of the world to prevent capital outows or
incite inows. Then, we group countries in dierent relevant categories and investigate whether we
can reject the hypothesis that the distribution of the rst digits of data that they provide complies
1For Greece's actions before joining the Euro zone, see The Wall Street Journal (2004). For the more recent
account of releasing dodgy budget statistics, see the Financial Times (2010). For Italy, see the Financial Times
(2001). Argentina's story is described for example in the Financial Times (2008) and The Wall Street Journal
(2008). The Hungarian case is treated in the Financial Times (2007). For accounts for China and the USA see the
Financial Times (2009).
2An alternative test would be to test whether the last digits of the data follow a uniform distribution. But we do
not have the data on these as many gures are rounded to their thousands. With more data, we could also apply
our test to the rst two digits of the data.
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with Benford's distribution. Using balance of payments data we nd evidence that countries with
xed exchange rate regimes, those with high negative net foreign asset positions or negative current
account balances misreport economic data. On top of that, countries with bad institutional quality
scores or those in Africa, Middle East, Eastern Europe and Latin America (at least the ones in our
sample) have unusual distributions of rst digits in the reported accounts that raise suspicions that
these countries may be altering data that they report. There is also evidence that some countries
misinformed investors in the wake of the Asian nancial crisis in 1997.
These interesting patterns are observed for many countries grouped based on sharing similar
characteristics. For example, if a country changes its exchange rate regime within the range of
our sample, its data will enter dierent categories. Therefore, the rejections of the null hypothesis
of conformity to Benford's law are not country specic, but rather category specic. Relying on
our evidence supporting our economic model we conclude that countries, at times, falsify economic
data and do it strategically, when it suits their interest. This calls for the inclusion of strategic
information provision by governments in models where public signals play an important role. We
doubt that the rejection of Benford's distribution for the rst digits of the data for many groups of
countries is due to just poor data collection and noise in the data in the less developed countries.3
Large positions in the errors and omissions section of the balance of payments data may indicate,
of course, that the data collection process in a given country is of low quality or that there is a
great amount of illicit or unrecorded transactions; but if there are no manipulations involved, the
rst digits of the series (even incompletely registering transactions) should still adhere to Benford's
law. Also, because we nd evidence for countries which would appear (at least in the short run,
according to our model) to benet from misinforming investors we do not think that the data
suers from rounding errors; if it were so, we would nd rejections of the null hypothesis all across
the board.
In our tests we use quarterly balance of payments data from the International Monetary Fund
for years 1989{2007, for several reasons. Firstly, this is accounting data that is available for many
countries from the same source. Secondly, the data is somewhat standardized as it should be
prepared (categorized) by providers according to an IMF manual. It oers a lot of datapoints
relatively to other data on economic fundamentals. Also, it is not transformed many times (and if
the balance is recorded in U.S. dollars it is not transformed at all) which could worsen its statistical
properties.4 Moreover, as the data is quarterly, it includes series that are closely watched by
investors so that countries may have an incentive to misrepresent them.
The tests we employ are used by accounting practitioners to detect fraud in company accounts
3This was the conclusion of Nye and Moul (2007) that analyzed Penn World Tables data.
4Nye and Moul (2007) found that economic series transformed many times with imprecise procedures (e.g., relying
on inaccurate exchange rates) may not obey Benford's law. They advise to work with the raw, nominal data.
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(see Nigrini [1999] for examples). Varian (1972) suggested to use Benford's Law to test the natu-
ralness of the data and adequacy of the numbers produced by forecasting models. These tests, to
our knowledge, were not used widely up to date in international (macroeconomic) comparisons (an
exception is Nye and Moul [2007]); there is typically a lack of enough suitable data to boost the
statistical power of such tests that render these methods impractical and until recently (for exam-
ple at the time of writing of Varian [1972]) the theoretical processes generating this distribution
were not well understood. Unfortunately, our methods do not allow us to detect which country at
what point provided false information. Also, we cannot claim how grave the possible infractions
were; we cannot exclude that these would be just some price tag eects, though the latter are likely
to appear rather in nominal currency rather than in U.S. dollars. For example, a country might
report instead of a decit on the trade balance of 2.01 billion in local currency a one that is slightly
lower, say at 1.99 billion. Our task is complicated by the fact that countries may not cheat all of
the time (and serial cheaters might be found out quickly); detecting fraud in one or two quarters
when many quarters of the data are present is then unlikely.
The only study that extensively uses Benford's distribution to inspect macroeconomic data is
that of Nye and Moul (2007). These authors provide evidence (and also simulations of economic
quantities) that widely used international macroeconomic data such as the GDP series in the Penn
World Tables exhibits rst digits that do in general conform to Benford's distribution. The data,
however, does not conform to Benford's law for non-OECD countries, posing questions mainly
about data quality; the alteration of data might come from the source (falsication or simply from
an inecient data collection infrastructure in the considered countries) or from transformations
like conversion of the nominal values into U.S. dollars. As such, however, they do not provide any
model why countries would misreport data and do it strategically as their focus is rather about
assessing the quality of data used in empirical work. It also appears that they do not correct for
the possible persistence of the economic series which could lead to false rejections of the conformity
of the realized rst-digit distribution with Benford's law, while we address this issue.
From the vast literature it is clear that the public signal is important for economic agents.
The literature on the truthfulness of information policies of countries, however, to date is meagre.
The problem is that it is not readily veriable by economic agents whether the information issued
by the government is of low quality (i.e., imprecise) or whether the government in question is
supplying deliberately false information.5 Each government or statistical authority has some leeway
in providing the various numbers describing the state of the economy as long as these are not too
far o from the public expectations; and as long as these can be subsequently put in the errors or
omissions sections. Related to the topic is a literature on public signals and transparency under
5Institutions like the International Monetary Fund or the Eurostat can verify at least partially the information
that is given out by the country, but this does not solve the problem in its entirety.
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strategic uncertainty recently represented inter alia by Morris and Shin (2002) or Angeletos and
Pavan (2007) and explicitly in the context of a currency attack by Heinemann and Illing (2002).
The notion of strategically misinforming investors has not been considered in this literature to our
knowledge; the authority can control at best the precision (the variance) of the public signal that
the investors get, which is not the same as what we mean here.6 Note, however, that changing
the precision of the signal would not constitute data manipulation and our tests would not pick it
up, as the data that would be generated should still adhere to Benford's law (see the arguments in
Section 4.1 below). Angeletos et al. (2006) and Tarashev (2007) oer models where the government
chooses a signal (the interest rate) to inform the public about the state of the economy. This
aects also the cost of the agent's later decision. But providing false information is a dierent
issue; the agents may not know well the information policy of the government and (provided that
the agents do pay attention to what the government says) this information may aect the belief
formation in one way or the other. Analyzing a second generation currency crisis model without
any strategic uncertainty, extending the work of Obstfeld (1986) and Obstfeld (1996), Sbracia and
Zaghini (2001) notes (without engaging into modeling the strategic choices of a central authority)
that greater precision of public information may stop an otherwise imminent attack when the state
of the economy is bad and also that the contrary is true when the state is good. This opens up
the question whether the government would like to use its information policy to its advantage.
On a dierent note, Sandleris (2008) argues that a country may repay sovereign debt in order
not to reveal bad information about the state of its economy. The literature on the strategic
delay of information release is related but does not apply here. The large literature on dynamic
inconsistency and limited commitment started by Kydland and Prescott (1977) is not relevant in
this context; and neither does the literature on moral hazard with ex-post veriable actions.
Successful misinformation on the side of the government may seem puzzling and is rarely taken
into account, as it is at odds with the assumption of rational expectations and the economic agents'
knowledge about the true state of the world employed in many models.7 In some models with
strategic uncertainty, information is aggregated through individual trades into prices; and hence
the governments' inuence over the information known to market participants may be extremely
limited. This, however, may be not true all the time; for example in a xed exchange regime where
an important price { the exchange rate { is xed and the shadow price (the real exchange rate)
must be calculated based on the statistics provided by governments. A fundamental question is
6A dierent notion is that of vagueness, when a policymaker would release a set of signals containing the true
one to be informative in the equilibrium; this notion is studied for example by Stein (1989) based on the model of
Crawford and Sobel (1982).
7The Billion Prices Project by Alberto Cavallo and Roberto Rigobon is an initiative by private agents to gather
information in lieu of government agencies (in this case on the evolution of prices). This way of substituting the
government, however, is limited by what can be observed by economic agents themselves. In the case of the balance
of payments or gross domestic product data, a similar project is hard to envisage.
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why individuals (knowing that the government may reveal information strategically) would pay
attention to public signals at all; however the basic conclusions of the literature on one-sided
private information when signalling is not possible (see for example Aumann et al. [1995]) claims
this can be the case, and partial information revelation may be an equilibrium. Another question
is whether the ability of governments to provide false information is permanent or just temporary;
in the long run serial cheaters may be found out. This paper, by providing some evidence on the
strategic character of government release of public signals, provides an incentive to continue and
expand theoretical research in these elds.
The paper is constructed as follows. First, we discuss the reasons for which countries would
want to misreport economic data; in Section 2 we lay out a model of nancial ows and of country
incentives to misinform investors about the state of the economy. Then in Section 3 we discuss
the data we use while in Section 4 we describe the statistical methodology. Section 5 reports the
evidence and Section 6 concludes. Tables with statistical documentation and results of our study
are included in the Appendix.
2 Incentives to misreport economic data
To x ideas, we provide a basic open economy model where we study the incentives of countries to
provide false information to investors. Suppose there are N identical countries with a population of
workers Li = 1 and endowed with respective immobile capital installed Ci > 0, with i 2 f1;:::;Ng;
we assume in particular that C1 = ::: = CN. Consider also an additional (N + 1)th country with
population of LN+1 = 1 and immobile capital CN+1 such that CN+1 < C1. There are also K
units of mobile capital in the world; for simplicity suppose these are owned by some agents which
have no domicile, but the capital has to be parked in at least one of the aforementioned countries.
There are free capital ows between all countries.
The state of each country's economy can be either High (h) or Low (`); for each country
m = 1; :::; N + 1, we denote by sm 2 fh;`g its state.8 In a high state of the world a country
is more productive, that is, denoting by A the common productivity of all countries, one has
A(h) > A(`). Each country has the same technology and the statistical process generating a
periods' productivity.
The capital (mobile and immobile) installed in country m = 1; :::; N +1 in a given state of the
world's economy is a function of all the states s1;:::;sN+1, which we denote by Km(s1;:::;sN+1).
With free capital ows, the end level of installed capital will not depend on the country's initial
endowment.
8We make no assumptions whether the realization of the states of the world are correlated between countries or
not.
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The production function in country m, given all countries' states





is Cobb{Douglas with the capital intensity 0 <  < 1. We will deal with the production function
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Ym=Lm and km = Km=Lm.
Suppose rst that the states of the world are easily observable among potential investors prior
to making the investment. Then, in equilibrium, the stocks of capital employed in each economy
are equal as the returns to capital are equalized between countries. That is, the functions Km are
equal in the following sense. The value of Km(s1;:::;sN+1) only depends on sm and on the total
number of countries that have high states of the world sj = h, when j 2 f1;:::;N +1g, a number






for all countries m (and the same for km and k). We assume that the endowments of capital Ci
and CN+1 are such that even when being in the low state ` each economy m would receive some
international ows.9 Further when considering two countries m and m0 in dierent states by the
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on global mobile capital demand and supply indicates that by conditioning on the possible values





















































We get after substitutions the capital values that would be employed in country N +1 respectively
9More precisely, that even if a country is the only one to receive a bad shock, it would still have some inows of
the international mobile capital.
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which means that the capital employed in a country falls as the number n(h) of countries with
high productivity in the given period increases.
Each country m's gross national product (the remuneration of domestic factors) is wLm+rCm.


































It is increasing in the state of the world sm and in the capital Cm.
Suppose now that the states of the world are not veriable by capital owners but each state
of the world is private information of each country. What are the incentives for say country
N + 1 to reveal the state of the world truthfully? Here we ignore what is the nature of the game
(for example, any potential punishments for faulty disclosure of the state of the world); we are
interested only in one country's payos from claiming a high instead of a low state of the world if
investors believed the statement and other countries report their states truthfully. In other words,
we consider a unilateral deviation by one country. Then investors, expecting a high state of the








, where n0(h) denotes the number of
countries m = 1;:::;N (country N + 1 excluded) reporting a high state. Now, in view of (6), the
payo for country N + 1 from misinforming investors is equal to the dierence of payos when
investors are fooled and invest despite the state of the country being low and the productivity


































Proposition 1. The payo (7) from misinforming investors is positive.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Countries that suer a low state of the world (low productivity) have thus incentives to mis-
report their true economic conditions. One can readily verify that this incentive is higher the
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a relatively large inow) and the lower capital CN+1 is installed in the country.
When we turn to data, we will interpret the last two observations in the following way. Countries
with high negative asset positions (i.e., endowed with little domestic capital), open to capital ows
and/or having a need of nancing their negative current account should have higher incentives to
misreport their true state of the economy; and in a time of a crisis (dened as a period with many
countries suering a bad state of the world) countries will have higher incentives to cheat. Such
countries are cautious not to experience large capital outows and/or face problems in renancing
their debts. Based on this, we suppose that countries that have a negative net asset position and
that have liquid portfolio markets are more likely to defend themselves during a crisis using all
means possible { including misreporting information.
It is possible to incorporate more features in the above model easily.
Fixed exchange rate regimes. Suppose there is a cost of  of abandoning a xed exchange
rate regime, and the country holds some reserves R of capital (or this is their borrowing capacity in
case of an attack). If the desired capital outows exceed R the exchange rate regime is assumed to
be abandoned (or a devaluation occurs). Then, this could lead to the realignment of the exchange
rate when a Low state of the world would succeed a High state (if the R held is low enough). A
truthful declaration of the state of the world would cost the country  apart from the eects of
having a lower installed capital stock as in (5). Hence, ceteris paribus, we expect that countries
with xed exchange rates are going to have more incentives to misreport economic data so as to
defend their exchange regime.
Countries open to capital ows. In what we assumed above, capital ows were unrestricted
for the mobile international capital. Suppose now that there are some bounds on capital ows, so
that say you have to pay a tax  in order to place capital into a country. Then, given the same net
foreign asset position, the same state of a world, a country with high openness (low ) will have
higher incentives to misinform investors in the low state of the world as the resulting capital ows
will be more important.
3 Data
For our tests to have rejection power as described in Section 4, we require a large amount of compa-
rable data. Furthermore, we seek economic series which could be manipulated by the government
and at the same time easily observed and followed by a large group of investors. For our purpose,
we use quarterly balance of payments data from the International Monetary Fund BOPS database
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for the period 1989{2007.10 This data is provided by statistical agencies of the IMF members and
should be prepared in a standard way, using the Balance of Payments manual of the IMF (2005).
It is provided in U.S. dollars, which means that the BOPS data was transformed in a minimal
way (see the importance of this in Nye and Moul [2007]) given the fact that most international
transactions are conducted in this currency. The initial date of 1989 is chosen for two reasons:
before 1989 the data is available for relatively few countries and international capital ows were
relatively small as the nancial markets were still closed; also after 1989 many newly established
countries (for example, from the break-up of USSR, Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia) emerge that
start providing statistics. For this reason, in the middle of 1990s we are able to have over 600
datapoints for each quarter. We use quarterly data because this is the data that investors often
take into account while making their decisions. Yearly data occurs with a sucient lag and may
not say much about future developments (and, as a result, may not be actively falsied); moreover
we would get four times fewer datapoints. Monthly data, on the other hand, is available only for
a few countries on a regular basis. We take all the net gures available for each country from the
Balance of Payments so as to lower the problem of persistence (see Section 4.3 for a discussion).
All in all, we have at maximum 13 entries11 per country for each quarter, with 76 quarters of
data. This gives us at a maximum 988 observations for each country. More detailed statistics for
the balance of payments data are not available for a large set of countries and often come with a
considerable lag.12
Data on the balance of payments is relevant for investors in the view of our model as it provides
information about the state of productivity of capital in a country in numerous ways. Firstly,
changes in the current account balance, inter alia, are a measure of the country's competitiveness
relative to the rest of the world. In a xed exchange regime, the value of the information coming
from the balance of payments is even higher to the agents as the exchange rate (which would
contain aggregate information about the underlying transactions) does not change. A sustained
current account imbalance may point to a misalignment of the real exchange rate. Moreover,
investors obtain information from the balance of payments about the solvency of the country and
its rms, so directly on the possible returns to capital within the country in the nearest future.
For example, changes in reserves, or changes in the volume and composition of the current account
items have implications for the ability to retire capital (for possible capital ow restrictions in the
future), the probability of a speculative attack (about the valuation of the capital installed in the
10The Balance of Payments data was accessed online at the IMF website on 31 December 2009.
11These are: Current Account: net; Goods: net; Services: net; Income: net; Current transfers: net; Capital
Account: net; Financial Account: net; Direct Investment: net; Portfolio Investment: net; Other Investment: net;
Financial Derivatives: net; Reserve Assets: net; Net Errors and Omissions.
12We are thus not using the data that is supplied directly to investors in real time, but the data that is given
to the IMF with some lag. Nevertheless, the IMF is an important lending institution which has an inuence on
the nancial conditions in many, especially non-OECD, countries. The data submitted to the IMF is also used by
market participants in their analyzes.
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country) or the solvency (or possible illiquidity problems) of the country and the rms located
there (which aects the value of their assets). Reinhart and Rogo (2009) include among the
best few predictors of banking crises and currency crashes (compiling from the rich literature on
early crisis indicators) respectively such indicators as the short-term capital inows/GDP, current
account balance/investment, current account balance/GDP and exports.
We could also (but chose not to) add into consideration other government issued data describing
the economy that are closely watched by investors such as ination, quarterly GDP or industrial
production gures. We did not do it, reluctantly, for the following important reasons. There are
considerably fewer statistics for GDP or industrial production available for each quarter for a wide
range of countries. Ination gures may be very persistent. All these measures are also calculated
using dierent methodologies from country to country and typically involve many transformations
of the data. On the other hand, balance of payments data comes for each country always from the
same provider, and it is fairly standardized accounting data.
To categorize countries according to their international investment position, we use the updated
and extended version of the External Wealth of Nations Mark II database developed by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007). These authors provide yearly estimates of foreign assets and liabilities in
the period 1970{2007 for many countries.
The exchange rate regimes were classied based on information of the International Monetary
Fund in various issues of the \Annual report on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions"
from the period 1989{2007 and the data provided by the Fund sta themselves; see IMF (1989{
2008). We opted for the de facto classications of the IMF. What matters for us is the end-of-period
(quarter) status of the regime. Any exchange rate regime where the intervention of the central
bank was substantial (a xed regime, a crawling peg, a crawling band) was considered as heavily
managed and labeled in our dataset as \xed."13 Such a wide range of regimes was classied
together to have a large number of dierent countries. We label a regime as \oating" when it
was deemed by the IMF as being independently oating.14 It is to note that the currencies that
were a part of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism I or II in a given quarter are considered
to belong to the xed category prior to the introduction of the Euro and as oating afterwards.
Data for institutional quality measures were taken from the World Bank's World Governance
Indicators database (Kaufmann et al. [2009]) while those for country ratings from the Institutional
Investor.
13Consequently, for example crawling band regimes prior to 1998, when the IMF adopted a new classication,
were coded as being xed from the category of managed oating.
14The remainder of the countries have regimes which are dicult to classify into either category. For some heavily
managed exchange rate regimes it is dicult to make a call whether it is a oating regime or not; and we preferred
only to make conservative assessments. Secondly, we classify here also countries when they do not have any own
legal tender (like Panama, El Salvador or Ecuador). Indeed, in our tests, countries with regimes that are neither
xed or oating exhibit dierent behavior than the two \ideal" regimes (available upon request).
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All in all, we have data for 103 countries for the period 1989{2007. We also considered a subset
of the data set described above; it is obtained by considering only the countries reporting balance
of payments data for at least once quarter and one series a year between 1995 and 2007, keeping
only the observations corresponding to the latter period of time. This subset will be referred to as
the stable sample in the sequel while the notion of full sample will refer to the whole data set. We
have 66 countries in the stable sample for the time period 1995{2007.15 We inspect this sample
for the following reasons. Some additional data that we use to provide conditions for slicing the
samples (data on country investment positions, World Governance Indicators etc.) is available
for many countries for this later period. Importantly, when we scrutinize yearly data only, the
number of observations per year remains roughly constant16 while using this stable subsample.
Moreover, the countries included therein may provide higher quality data. For example, Poland is
excluded from this sample as it did not report the data between 1996{2000 when it was changing
and improving the statistical methodology of balance of payments reporting. Some countries may
have not reported the data also for strategic motives. For these reasons, the stable sample is our
preferred one.
Our dataset contains data from heterogenous countries from all continents (cf. Section A). The
characteristics of the data are given in Table II. The basic characteristics of the variables in the
full and stable samples do not dier substantially. The major exception is in the exchange rate
regimes: a higher fraction of the observations is available for the purely oating regimes in the
stable sample than in the full sample (36:3% vs. 28:2% respectively) and a lower fraction for xed
exchange rate regimes (37:5% vs. 45:8% respectively). The countries in the stable sample have on
average slightly higher liabilities but have higher net foreign assets (are less indebted). On average,
they also have better institutional rankings.
4 Statistical methodology
In this section we rst recall why it is expected in theory that the numbers contained in the balance
of payments data would follow a specic distribution called Benford's law and then show that this
is empirically the case. We then demonstrate using chi-square tests of goodness of t that this
conformity to Benford's law extends to most of the randomly selected subsets of this data set with
either many countries involved or few quarters per country.
A persistence issue appears for the subsets containing data from few countries for many (con-
15Choosing 1994 as the initial year would give us only 61 countries with more incomplete data, while picking 1996
would only raise the number of countries in the sample to 70. In both cases the alternative choice would lead to
fewer observations being included in the stable sample. As we need as many countries and quarters as possible given
the arguments advanced in Section 4, the choice of the sample 1995{2007 is a natural one.
16This is because some net items are not provided at all times even by countries in this sample.
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secutive) quarters; these usually do not conform to Benford's law. The reason is that the same rst
digits may be present for several quarters, and since we do not have a suciently large number
of time periods, the distribution of the rst digits may appear to be unusual even when no data
manipulation is in place. To overcome this persistence problem and study such subsets, we create a
new assessment criterion based on choosing sub-subsets of these subsets at random a large number
of times.
4.1 Benford's law
Simon Newcomb (1881) noted, by looking at the most worn pages of logarithmic tables, that
rst digits of real-life numbers were not uniformly distributed but that the smallest values were
more likely. He postulated that this could be explained by a \law of probability of the occurrence
of numbers [...] such that all mantissas of their logarithms are equally probable." A similar
observation was made again, independently, by the physicist Franck Benford (1938). He collected
a huge amount of data from various sources (street addresses, numbers appearing in a given issue of
the Reader's Digest, surface area of rivers, etc.) to estimate the corresponding universal distribution
of the rst digits of these numbers, leading to the same distribution as the one proposed by
Newcomb and named since then Benford's law. The predicted occurrences of rst digits are given,








The values of these frequencies j are given in Table I. This law also describes the frequencies
of occurrences of the next digits, which we do not use here for the lack of a sucient number of
observations.
j j j j
1 30:1% 6 6:7%
2 17:6% 7 5:8%
3 12:5% 8 5:1%
4 9:7% 9 4:6%
5 7:9%
Table I: Benford's law (1;:::;9) for the rst digits.
4.1.1 Mathematical foundations of Benford's law
Three natural processes or characterizations lead the data to have this distribution, which, as
described below, is important for our purposes. These are processes with exponential growth;
Tomasz Michalski and Gilles Stoltz 13Do countries falsify economic data strategically? Some evidence that they do.
scale-invariant (unit-invariant) processes; and random samples of random distributions. We label
these properties F1, F2, and F3 and this is how we refer to them in the remainder of the text.
(F1) Processes with exponential growth. Diaconis (1977) shows that geometric sequences
fa; a2; :::; ang with ratio a such that log10 a is irrational17 lead to sets of data that conform
more and more closely to Benford's law as n grows. That is, almost all geometric sequences
lead to Benford's law as the set of rational numbers has a null measure within the set of all
real numbers. This implies that in practice all geometric sequences linked to real data lead the
data to obey Benford's law. The result can be extended to certain random geometric sequences
fX1; X1X2; :::; X1X2 Xng.
Another generating process: log{uniform mantissas. Another generating process that is
less interpretable in terms of economic modeling but is useful to gain intuition is to pick numbers
Y1;:::;Yn at random in the interval [1;10) such that the random variables log10 Y1; :::; log10 Yn are
uniformly distributed over the interval [0;1); that is, we consider log{uniform mantissas. Then, for
all natural integers k1;:::;kn, the distribution of the rst digits of the numbers Y1 10k1; :::; Yn 
10kn converges to Benford's law as n grows.
(F2) Scale invariance. Pinkham (1961) and Hill (1995a) proved that Benford's law was the
unique law such that the distribution of the rst digits of number drawn at random according to
it was stable when the drawn numbers are multiplied by a common multiplicative factor.
(F3) Random samples of random distributions. Hill (1995b) considered the case of data
sets with numbers chosen at random according to a two-step procedure choosing rst at random a
distribution over the positive real numbers, then, drawing k numbers according to it, and nally
repeating the whole procedure a large number n of times; he provided natural conditions on
the distribution of the random probability distribution for Benford's law to occur when n grows.
Janvresse and de la Rue (2004) showed that it suces to consider random probability distributions
taking values in the family of uniform distributions over intervals. This mathematical phenomenon
shows in particular that data coming from many dierent distributions is much more likely to
conform to Benford's law, as observed18 by Benford himself in his attempt to collect a huge amount
of data.
17Otherwise the sequence of the rst digits is cyclic and has asymptotic proportions that are rational and thus
are dierent from the ones of Benford's law; consider the simple example when log10 a = 2=3, in which case the
sequence is 102k=3 and contains only elements with rst digits equal to the rst digits of 102=3, 104=3, and 100, that
is, 4, 2, 1; the asymptotic repartition of the rst digits is uniform between these three numbers.
18Raimi (1969) points out that whereas many tables of data considered by Benford did not conform individually
to the prescribed law, their union did: \what came closest of all, however, was the union of all his tables."
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4.1.2 Application to macroeconomic data
Based on the above properties F1{F3, and on the properties of articially generated sequences
in the existing literature, we argue that macroeconomic data should lead to Benford's law; the
discussion that follows refers heavily to Nye and Moul (2007).
Theoretical grounds. The sequence of macroeconomic statistics for a given country should, if
observed for a long enough time, result in a collection of numbers with distribution of rst digits
abiding Benford's law; this is due to economic growth and ination, in virtue of the mathematical
foundation F1. For example, in a stationary economy with constant real GDP, the rst digits of
the nominal GDP gures should adhere to Benford's distribution in the long run when the rate
of ination is for example 5% because log10 1:05 is irrational. The presence of some errors in
the data does not impact per se its conformity to Benford's law, provided that these errors can
be described in terms of random multiplicative factors whose logarithms only put mass on the
irrational numbers, as in foundation F1. Property F2 states that the distribution of rst digits
according to Benford's law is preserved even if data for a country was provided in home currency
and then converted into U.S. dollars (which is the case for the balance of payments data that we
have). Finally, foundation F3 means that aggregating the data of several countries also preserves
the conformity to Benford's law { and even should increase it; this is important to remember
especially when the number of data points per country is too small (i.e., the series are too short)
for foundation F1 to lead to the conformity to Benford's law per se.
Previous studies. Varian (1972) suggested assessing the quality of data generated by forecast-
ing models by testing whether the distributions of the rst digits of the generated data adhere
to Benford's law. He generated series from some economic forecasting models and conrmed that
indeed the generated data appears to be natural. At the time of his writing, however, the theo-
retical foundations F1{F3 were not known. The most thorough study of conformity to Benford's
law of data in macroeconomics to date was pursued by Nye and Moul (2007). They showed by
means of simulations that long enough sequences of nominal GDPs for a set of ctitious countries
formed sequences of numbers whose rst digits obey Benford's law, provided that the random eco-
nomic factors (various growth rates) were set in a proper way. They then illustrated on the Penn
World Tables dataset that some subgroups of countries (OECD countries on the one hand, African
countries on the other hand) are such that the data set obtained by aggregating their GDP data
was conform to the predictions of Benford's law. They also argued that various transformations
of data that are operated on nominal data (and require ination adjustments, purchasing power
indices, etc.) may alter the quality of data, since they lead to sets of numbers that do not conform
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anymore to Benford's law. That is, they used Benford's law as a test of naturalness of the data, as
is the case in other elds, e.g., accounting. All in all, they came with the conclusion that \broadly
speaking, country GDP gures should be consistent with Benford's distribution when countries are
heterogeneous in their initial levels (e.g., population, currency relative to U.S. dollar, per-capita
income) and then grow."
4.1.3 Use of Benford's law in other elds
The idea of detecting manipulations in the data by tests of conformity to Benford's law is now well
established is auditing and accounting, after the seminal article of Nigrini (1996) and the successful
use of his methodology by the authorities of the city of New York, leading to the detection of frauds
in seven companies; see Nigrini (1999) for an extended review of many other successful stories. The
methodology there is to use as the data set to be tested all quantities appearing in accounts (the
values of all individual transactions); the theoretical justication behind this is idea is mainly the
foundation F3 discussed above.
Other occurrences and practical uses of Benford's law can be found, e.g., in Hill (1995b); one
can cite, among others, stock market data and census statistics as occurrences and the design of
more ecient computers as a possible use.
4.2 Conformity of our proposed data set to Benford's law
The theoretical properties F1{F3, the previous empirical studies as Nye and Moul (2007) or the
accounting literature imply that the balance of payments data (which is accounting data) should
conform in its entirety to Benford's law; hence we do not provide any simulations of articial
balance of payments series, but we turn directly to the empirical assessment below.
We consider here the aggregated data set obtained by considering all available series of the
balance of payments data for all countries and all quarters (henceforth referred to as the full
sample); we study the conformity of the rst digits of the numbers thus obtained to Benford's law
via the chi-square test of goodness of t against this distribution.
Such a goodness-of-t test compares the empirical frequencies b j of the digits j 2 f1;:::;9g to









where N denotes the total number of numbers (of rst digits) available in the data set. The statistic
D2 converges in distribution to a chi-square distribution with 8 degrees of freedom as N ! 1; in
practice, the distribution of D2 is close enough to this limit whenever N > 30 and Nj > 5 for all
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This approximation is used to report P{values associated with values of the statistic D2 in the
tables.
In the rst line of the rst four columns of Table III, we assess the conformity of the data set
considered in its entirety to Benford's law; we report in the third column the corresponding P{value
and in the fourth column the value of N. The rst and second columns indicate the number of
countries encompassed by the economic condition considered (e.g., no condition, whether a country
was an OECD member in 1989 or not), as well as the average number of quarters per country. In
the case of the full sample, these two quantities equal respectively 103 and 76 as indicated above.
Since the P{value is much larger than any conventional threshold for rejecting a null hypothesis,
we see that the data set considered globally conforms to Benford's law. This conclusion extends
to some subsets of the data, in particular to those formed by OECD and non-OECD countries or
the stable sample discussed at the end of Section 3.
4.3 Conformity of subsets of the data set to Benford's law: An issue of
persistence
In this paper, we consider subsets of the entire balance of payments data set dened by some
economic conditions and show that some of them, for appropriately chosen conditions, lead to
subsets whose distributions of the rst digits do not conform to Benford's law.
Before doing this we need to show that in the BOPS data set typical randomly drawn subsets
do conform to the latter law. These subsets are the ones corresponding to the choice of a large
number of countries and/or a few number of quarters per country. (This statement is to be made
precise below.)
Before presenting this detailed study, we motivate it by the perhaps deceiving results that are
obtained when testing whether the data corresponding to each country is Benford distributed or
not: the test accepts the hypothesis of conformity to Benford's law at the level 5% for 58 countries
but rejects it for 44 other countries (whereas no conclusion can be drawn for the remaining country,
Serbia, for which fewer than N = 110 observations are available). That is, if one chooses one country
with enough observations at random, the obtained data set will not conform to Benford's law with
probability 44=(44 + 58)  43:1%. There is no striking pattern in countries for which we obtain
these rejections. For example, we reject the null hypothesis for the USA, France, Switzerland,
Japan or Canada while for many non-OECD countries we cannot.
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As already noted and illustrated by simulations in Nye and Moul (2007, Section I), it seems
necessary to consider several countries for the corresponding data subset to conform to Benford's
law; this is to increase heterogeneity at the initial levels and match the requirement provided by
the foundation F3 that the number n of separately drawn subsets should be large. For example,
although for many individual OECD countries the distribution of the rst digits does not conform
to Benford's law (as noted above), for the entire set of the OECD countries for which we have
data (which includes 22 countries) Benford's distribution cannot be rejected (see Table III). We
further illustrate this fact on the top part of Table IV, where we estimated the probability that
when choosing a given number C of countries at random from our balance of payments data set,
the data subset formed by these C countries passes the test of goodness of t against Benford's
law at the 5% level.
This table indicates that a signicant fraction of the subsets formed by C countries, with C 6 70,
cannot be said to be distributed according to Benford's law. Only when taking a large number of
countries (e.g., C = 80), one gets subsets that typically can be said to conform to Benford's law.
4.3.1 Persistence issues sidestepped: considering fewer quarters per country
In the subsets grouped by economic conditions, however, fewer countries will be typically involved;
fewer quarters too, and this will be the key. Indeed, as is shown in Table IV (bottom table, rst
lines of each group of lines), the rejection rates become smaller as either the number C of involved
countries increases or the number M of quarters picked at random for each country decreases.
This phenomenon can be explained by persistence of data from one quarter to another for
individual countries; it is especially crucial to deal with it when a small number C of countries is
involved for otherwise, enough heterogeneity is introduced for the aggregated data to conform to
Benford's law. We use net items from the International Monetary Fund BOPS database to reduce
persistence as much as possible, but obviously an extra treatment is needed. Before showing this
treatment, we give a second illustration of persistence.
4.3.2 Persistence issues sidestepped: selecting some series from the balance of pay-
ments data
All previous methods relied on considering for each country{quarter pair all the 13 series that occur
in the balance of payments data we obtained from the IMF. We now study what happens when
only some series are selected. To that end we considered two choices, the independent series and
the less persistent series.
The rst subset of series is formed by taking into account the identities that occur in the
balance of payments data and by removing a series for each such identity; several choices were
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possible and the one we made is the following: Current account; Goods; Services; Income; Finan-
cial account; Direct investment; Portfolio investment; Financial derivatives; Reserve assets; Net
errors and omissions. That is, we dropped the series: Current transfers; Capital account; Other
investment.
The second subset of series is formed by taking, out of the 13 series, the 6 series which showed
on average the smallest persistence from one quarter to another. For each series and each country,
we computed the number of breaks in the sequence of the rst digits indexed by quarters and
then considered the average of these results with respect to countries. The series included in the
resulting subset are then: Financial account; Portfolio investment; Other investment; Financial
derivatives; Reserve assets; Net errors and omissions.
We rst study what happens for individual countries. We recall that using all series, the data
corresponding to 58 countries could be said to conform to Benford's law whereas for 44 countries,
it did not pass the test (whereas for 1 country there was not enough data). For independent series,
the respective gures are 54, 44, and 5 while for the less persistent series, we obtain 78, 15, and
10. Clearly, the persistence of the series does matter for rejections of Benford's distribution for
individual countries.
In addition to this comparison, we also used the same random drawing methodology as above
to obtain Table IV. We only reported therein the results for all series and the less persistent
ones since the consideration of the independent series instead of all series almost does not change
the picture for any pair (C;M) (detailed results provided upon request). On the other hand, the
restriction to series chosen as being the less persistent ones ensures that for almost all pairs, the
rejection rates get close to or smaller than 5%.
This illustrates once again that the observed persistence is due to a lack of independence in the
quarter-to-quarter values of the series and is not linked to an intra-quarter dependence caused by
the identities between the series of the balance of payments.
4.3.3 Remedy: Considering random sub-subsets
A remedy could have been to select only the less persistent series; however, doing so one may not
detect the manipulations on the most crucial series (that are watched and analyzed by investors),
which can be the most persistent ones as well (for example, the balance on the current account
or goods entries). Some persistent series in fact may also be such because they are manipulated.
This is why we focus on the fact that conformity to Benford's law is highly likely when the data
subset is formed randomly by the consideration of few quarters only (relatively to the number of
countries) as seen in Table IV.
In particular, Table IV shows that when at most 10 quarters are selected at random for each
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country of the data set (that is, by taking a random fraction of about 10% of the data subset),
the resulting data subset typically conforms to Benford's law.
We use this observation in the following way. While assessing the conformity of a subset, we do
not consider all quarters of the corresponding subset, but take a small fraction of them at random
and test for the conformity to Benford's law, a procedure we repeat a large number of times. The
average rejection rate will be an indicator of conformity to Benford's law without the bias due to
persistence.
The method formally here is, given a subset D of the data, to pick at random a given fraction
f of its country{quarter pairs, form the corresponding sub-subset, and test whether the latter can
be said distributed according to Benford's law at the level 5%; a fact that we denote by RD, which
is therefore a Bernoulli random variable. We repeat this procedure a large number of times, say,
1;000 times, by xing D but by choosing dierent sub-subsets of it at random. This gives rise
to the random variables RD;1; RD;2; :::; RD;1000, which, conditionally to D, are independent and
identically distributed according to a Bernoulli distribution with parameter denoted by qD. We
consider the empirical mean RD;1000 of these random variables as the statistic of interest.
The heuristics behind this procedure is to reduce eciently the average number of consecutive
quarters at hand per country, thus weakening persistence issues, and to consider qD instead of the
P{value quantifying the goodness of t of D against Benford's law. The repetition of the procedure











is a condence interval at a 95% condence level for qD, where, given that the typical realized
values of RD;1000 are around 0:10, the precision of the estimation of the rejection rate qD is about
2%.
To be able to use this new criterion, we rst determine the typical values of the statistic RD;1000
when f 2 f5%;10%; 20%g and D is a set drawn at random19 from Benford's distribution with
a given size N. Results are reported in Table V, which provides estimates of the quantiles of the
underlying distribution according to the values of f. These estimates were constructed by running
1;000 times the above procedure on randomly generated sets D. This involved computing 106 tests
of goodness of t per cell of the table; because of the computational cost, no sharper estimates
based on more repetitions are provided.
This method provides us with another test of conformity to Benford's law of subsets D; this
19Of course, it is immediate that in this case, the expectation of RD;1000 (with respect to the choice of D and the
random subset) is 5% but we want a sharper idea of its distribution, namely, good estimates of its tail.
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test, given D, compares the obtained value of RD;1000 to the above quantiles and is then able to
associate a P{value with the hypothesis of conformity to Benford's law. This is done by identifying
in which interval of the last line of Table V (corresponding to the chosen f) this value lies in. For
instance, if the realized value of the statistic RD;1000 is 8:5 and f was chosen equal to 10%, the
corresponding P{value is between 1% and 5%; or if the realized value is 5:4 and f was chosen
equal to 5%, the the corresponding P{value is larger than 5%.
4.4 Conclusions of the initial statistical study
4.4.1 How to assess the conformity to Benfords's law
The aim of this preliminary statistical study was rst to show that the considered data set globally
conforms to Benford's law and secondly to exhibit conditions under which the subsets of this data
set are or are not typically Benford distributed. For the latter, a trade-o between
{ the consideration of many consecutive or close in time quarters (issue of persistence)
{ and the number of countries at hand (which increases the heterogeneity)
needs to be set: if there are too few countries, not more than a small number of quarters per
country can be taken, otherwise the behavior of subset is doomed to be far from Benford's law.
This restriction to a small number of quarters can be done at random, leading to the proposed
remedy against the persistence issue, which relies on subsampling in a proportion f, with f 2
f5%; 10%; 20%g in the experiments below. We call these, respectively, 1-in-20 (when f = 5%),
1-in-10 (when f = 10%), and 1-in-5 (when f = 20%) criteria. We are going to include the 1-in-10
criterion in our main results as this already delivers good randomness of the sampled data, but is
not as demanding in terms of the number of required observations as the 1-in-20 criterion.20
Alternatively, one can also discard the most persistent series in the balance of payments data;
the remaining series typically exhibit behavior close to what is predicted by Benford's law (as
shown by the small rejection rates indicated in Table IV).
In the rest of the study, we will identify the subsets of the data dened by some economic
conditions that are detected not to conform to Benford's law whereas the subsets of their sizes
should typically do. This will ag the conditions under which manipulations or at least embellishing
of the data was performed. The resulting practical criteria to assess the conformity of a subset D
to Benford's law of our balance of payments data in this respect are summarized below.
20More precisely, to ensure that for each chi-square goodness-of-t that need to be performed at least 110 obser-
vations, as mentioned in (9), are available, at least 1;100 and 2;200 are respectively needed to compute the 1-in-10
and 1-in-20 criteria.
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(C1) The plain P{value of the chi-square test of goodness of t on D the is a relevant statistic if
and only if the average number of quarters per country is small (of the order of 10); or if the
number of involved countries is large (of the order of 80); or if the number of countries is
moderate (larger than 60) and the average number of quarters is not too large (less or equal
to 20). These statements are made precise by the rejection rates exhibited in Table IV.
(C2) The criterion based on random sub-subsets of D (1-in-10) is an ecient way to reduce the
bias due to persistence when few countries are involved with many quarters of data each.
The obtained rejection rates should be compared to the quantiles provided in Table V.
(C3) The consideration of the less persistent series brings auxiliary information on whether the
possible non-conformity to Benford's law indicated by criteria C1 and/or C2 may or may not
be due to the persistence of the balance of payments data. However, nding a conformity of
the rst digits of these less persistent entries with Benford's distribution does not indicate
that there is no data falsication going on at all.
4.4.2 Application to the conformity of the BOPS data set
We included all the criteria discussed above in Table III. We see that all three criteria C1{C3
indicate a good adequation of the rst digits of the balance of payments data to Benford's law.
There is no evidence that Benford's distribution does not describe well either the rst digits of
balance of payments entries either for the whole sample or our subsample of countries for which
we have at least one data point for each year after 1995 (the \stable" sample, dened below). It
does not appear either important whether we restrict the samples to include only OECD members
(as of 1989) or not. This is very important, as we do not nd that non-OECD countries have
non-Benford distributions of the rst digits which is very dierent from the results of Nye and
Moul (2007) on the Penn World Table dataset and we do not believe that these countries provide
data of low quality.
We turn now to our main object of interest, detecting deviations from Benford's law for dierent
groups of countries.
5 Results for country-quarter groups based on economic
conditions
As discussed at the end of Sections 3 and 4, in our investigation we oer results for two samples {
the full sample of balance of payments data for 1989{2007 and a \stable" subsample of countries
which provided data at least once each year. We perform chi-square goodness-of-t tests on the
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subsamples grouping country-quarter pairs by economically meaningful characteristics to detect
any irregularities in the rst-digit behavior. The null hypothesis is that the rst digits of the
data are drawn from Benford's distribution. Based on our model in Section 2, we believe that
some groups of countries have higher incentives to tweak their balance of payments statistics than
others. Fixed exchange rate regime countries may be wary to provide truthful information about
the developments in the balance of payments because of a fear of an attack on their currency
that unfavorable information may trigger. Countries with high net foreign asset positions in terms
of GDP or those having negative current account balances may fear that too much of negative
information in the balance of payments data may spur a nervous reaction of investors and capital
outows, which they would like to avoid. This would be also especially true in times of a global
crisis.
While investigating the specicity of countries with xed exchange rate regimes or negative
current account balances, we also look at subgroups of countries that have relatively higher negative
foreign assets or higher foreign liabilities. We look at the following criteria, for which we indicate
in parentheses the shortcut used in the tables to report their values:
{ net foreign assets as a ratio of GDP (NFA GDP);
{ net foreign assets excluding foreign direct investment to GDP (NFA EXCL FDI GDP);
{ liabilities to GDP ratio (LIAB GDP);
{ liabilities excluding foreign direct investment to GDP (LIAB EXCL FDI GDP);
{ foreign equity liabilities to GDP ratio (EQ LIAB GDP);
{ the sign of the current account in a given quarter (CA).
In grouping countries we investigate datasets that are the unions of various conditions. For the
international investment positions, we took the top 75% of countries ranked in terms of negative
net foreign assets or foreign liabilities.21 In all cases, we use previous year's gures for grouping
countries. So, for example to test for a group of countries with xed exchange rate regimes that also
belong to countries with high total foreign liabilities in the whole sample, we took all the countries
which had the total liabilities to GDP ratio higher than 0.5427 in the preceding year that also
had a xed regime.22 As a measure of capital openness we used the foreign equity liabilities/GDP
21In the robustness checks, we also check what happens when we use the top 90%, 80%, 66:66% or 50% of
countries (not reported).
22The quantiles of a given economic quantity (e.g., net foreign assets to GDP) were computed by considering all
the available values of the quantity as countries and quarters vary; that is, at most one value of the quantity per
country-quarter pair of the sample (full or stable) was considered: none when the quantity was unavailable and one
when the data contained information about it. For this reason the number of available observations in, for instance,
the top 10% or lower 10% of the country{quarter pairs for this criterion may dier; the dierence is due to the
grouping according to the criterion by itself.
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ratio. A relatively higher value of this indicator shows that a country is de facto more open to
private capital ows than others, and hence may be also more prone to capital outows.23
The amount of data that we were able to gather allows for grouping the countries into many
dierent subsamples; however with many restricting conditions very quickly these subsamples may
become small, containing few countries but with many quarters of data which would lead to easy
rejections of Benford's distribution due solely to persistence, as discussed in Section 4.3. In such
cases, we want to rely on the 1-in-10 condition but then we need about 2,000 observations to be
able to use these results, as discussed in Section 4.3.3. Hence we are unable to slice the data very
nely; this is against our story as we cannot condition very well in each category for countries that
may have higher incentives to cheat.
We oer several robustness checks of our main goodness-of-t tests. First of all, we typically
test whether for the complement of the set for a given restricting condition (or an alternative regime
in the case of an exchange rate regime) we reject Benford's distribution for the rst digits as well
or not. Such a rejection would make our claim of the relevance of a potential category for grouping
countries and detecting data manipulation vacuous. Next, we want to know whether it is not only
one country which drives the result for a particular category. This may indicate that out of the
whole group only one country is either providing false information or, for example, suers from a
dire problem of persistence in its quarterly data. The fact that such a country would drive the
results would invalidate the generality of the claim, as single individual countries might report data
with non-Benford distributed rst digits for dierent reasons. This number of countries driving the
results (which we label as the \stability index") is quantied by the number of countries which,
when excluded from the subset, lead to acceptance of the null hypothesis at a level of 10%; that
is, we count the number of countries such that when they are excluded one at a time the P{value
associated with the goodness-of-t test to Benford's law increases from less than 5% to more than
10%. We would like our stability index to be zero when we expect to reject the null hypothesis.
We also test for the rejection of Benford's distribution for the less persistent items in the balance of
payments and oer results for dierent criteria based on random sub-subsets (1-in-5 and 1-in-20).
5.1 Fixed exchange rate regimes
In Tables VI{VII we present the tests for the conformity of the rst digits of the balance of payments
data with Benford's distribution for country{quarter pairs groups in terms of their exchange regimes
(xed or oating, as dened in Section 3) at the end of a quarter. The left hand column presents
the characteristics of the groups considered.
23We did not use the total portfolio liabilities (equity and debt) as many debt liabilities for a country consist of
foreign denominated debt which is traded outside of the country borders. There are also fewer datapoints for this
measure.
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First of all, we observe that the null hypothesis of conformity to Benford's law is rejected for
xed exchange rate countries both for the stable and full samples at a 1% signicance level. The
subsets of countries that have xed exchange rate regimes contains many countries (84 countries
with 32.6 quarters on average for the whole sample and 49 countries with 26.6 quarters on average
for the stable sample) so that we believe based on Section 4.3.1 that the persistence is not driving
our results. The 1-in-10 criterion conrms this. The important thing to notice is that any irregular
behavior detected here may not be country specic, as many countries in our samples (27 and 40
respectively for the stable and full samples) change the xed exchange rate regime to oating (or
the other way round) at least once.
Moreover, in all further considered scenarios (after imposing more restrictive conditions) groups
of countries with xed exchange rate regimes have distributions of the rst digits for which the
hypothesis of Benford's distribution is rejected at a 1% level for all series. The 1-in-10 criterion
conrms our ndings as these statistics are always greater than 10. More precisely, the level of
signicance of the rejection increases by a large amount when we further rene the picture and
consider countries which belong to the upper 75% in terms of the size of their total foreign liabilities,
the (negative) net foreign assets (with or without foreign direct investment), and equity liabilities.
This is also true for xed exchange rate regime countries that have a negative current account
balance in a particular quarter. This supports our hypothesis that countries with xed exchange
rate regimes that would be more sensitive to capital ows have an interest in tinkering with the
signals that they send out to investors. In particular, the rejection rate of Benford's distribution
for countries with xed exchange rate regimes and relatively liquid equity markets within our
sample (which means they need to be de facto open to individual nancial ows) is 0:00004% in
the stable sample and 0:0007% in the full sample! This occurs for a large number of countries (38
and 58 countries respectively) in this category with an average dataspan of 17.8 and 24.2 quarters.
Our ndings square with the model that we presented in Section 2: it is the countries with xed
exchange rate regimes that wish to misreport data; and among these countries it is those that have
higher negative net asset positions or higher openness that have more incentives to do so.
We believe that the results discussed above survive our stress tests (shown in Tables VIII{IX).
For the full sample, the hypotheses of Benford's distribution of the rst digits is still rejected even
when we exclude from the sample each country one-by-one (as the values \0" for the stability
indexes indicate); which means that there may be several countries in a given group that are
responsible for the result. Even when we run the tests on less persistent series of the balance of
payments, we still get rejections of the hypothesis of the rst-digit distribution being Benford at a
5% level{except for the full sample for the xed exchange rate regimes that have more liquid equity
markets or the entire unconditioned group. This is also a strong indication that the rejections may
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not be due to the persistence of the data. We also run the tests excluding the entries on the reserve
assets, which in xed exchange rate regimes may experience large movements due to the readiness
of the central bank to buy and sell currency at a prespecied rate. It does not seem thus that the
unusual distribution of the rst digits comes from the activity in this entry. The 1-in-5 and 1-in-20
criteria tell the same story as the 1-in-10 criterion. Taking dierent quantiles for the conditions
preserves all of the results for the top 90, 80, and 66.66 percents of the conditions and most for
the 50 percent (however, we start having few observations here for some conditions). The picture
does not change when we condition on contemporaneous year values of net foreign asset/GDP or
liabilities/GDP ratios.
These results contrast strongly with similar tests for the oating exchange rates regimes, for
which the null hypothesis cannot be rejected even for one category, also when we use the same
conditions on the investment positions of a country. Notice also that the number of countries with
oating regimes included in each sample is always lower than for the xed regimes in the same
category; again this may be an indication that the persistence issue does not matter here.
It seems odd that our results would occur only due to the specicity of the economic processes
under a xed exchange rate regime. The fact that some items of the balance of payments (like
changes in reserves) may be more variable in a xed exchange rate regime should not matter as
long as the processes generating the data are well behaved and properties F1{F3 are preserved.
In a xed exchange regime, there is still ination and growth that would lead the balance of
payments data to evolve according to a process that leads to Benford's law; and we still aggregate
across many countries. In fact, some xed exchange regimes country groups do exhibit rst digit
distributions for which the hypothesis that these are drawn from Benford's distribution cannot be
rejected. These are OECD countries (as of 1989) or countries that have high Institutional Investor
ratings (above 68), which would be one of the indicators according to Reinhart and Rogo (2009)
placing them in the group of advanced economies (results not shown). Another question thus
appears: can this be driven by the fact that xed exchange rate regimes are more often adopted by
less developed countries that for example score badly in terms of the quality of institutions? This
again seems unlikely, as we obtain changes in the strength of rejections (lower P{values, higher
1-in-10 criteria) when adding further conditions. In particular, we obtain strongest rejections for
the category of countries with xed regimes and most internationally open capital markets, which
is typically the feature of more developed countries. Consistent rejections of the null hypothesis
across categories also for the less persistent series for countries with xed exchange rate regimes also
indicate that this is a non-issue, as for most categories of countries with low quality of institutions
the hypothesis of the rst digits conforming to Benford's distribution cannot be rejected for these
series, as is discussed in Section 5.5.
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It thus appears that among countries with xed exchange rate regimes there are some which
strategically misinform investors as the distribution of the rst digits of the balance of payments
data they report is unusual. This is true especially for countries which may face higher outows
due to the stock of liabilities they owe to the outside world. It becomes even more so for countries
which are de facto open in terms of capital ows (and have higher equity/GDP liabilities than
other countries). There is economic rationale why this may be the case: in a xed exchange rate
regime the aggregate information contained in the behavior of the exchange rate is missing, and
investors need to rely more on the information provided by the country, which may want to tweak
it in order to put itself in a more favorable light.
5.2 Countries with high negative foreign asset liabilities
We discuss here tests on whether countries with higher net foreign asset positions misreport their
economic data.
In Tables X{XI we show the P{values of tests for dierent centiles of the data when countries
are ranked according to the ratios of net foreign assets excluding foreign direct investment (FDI)
stocks to GDP for the full and the stable samples. This is the most apt measure of the capital stock
that could rapidly move out of a country; FDI ows, which are largely immobile in the short run,
are excluded, and we take the net value of assets. We use the previous year's value for the current
year quarters to determine in which group a country should be placed in a particular quarter.
We see that for the rst digits of the balance of payments data for the 10%, 20%, and 25% of
countries with the worst net foreign asset position (excluding FDI) in the stable sample the null
hypothesis is rejected at the 5% signicance level, with the 1-in-10 criterion conrming this. We
also obtain strong evidence on the full sample but only for the top 10% most indebted countries
with liquid liabilities.
The results described above survive several robustness checks while some other conditions that
lead to rejections and are not meaningful from the point of view of economics do not (these checks
are reported in Tables XII{XIII). First, for the complement of the sets dened by conditions we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of conformity to Benford's law. With the exclusion of one or more
countries we still reject Benford's distribution for the previously agged categories as indicated by
the stability indexes. This is not the case for other categories (the 75% least indebted countries
with liquid liabilities on the full sample or the 75% most indebted countries for the stable sample).
In addition, we obtain a rejection of Benford's distribution for the rst digits of the data for the
10% most indebted countries on the stable sample also for the less persistent series. The 1-in-20
and 1-in-5 indicators give the same indication as the 1-in-10 criterion.
Let us comment further on the rejection of the null hypothesis for the 25% of countries with
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the highest net foreign assets for the full sample, which is not conrmed further for the highest
10% of such countries and which does not pass the stability check. This may be driven by one
country that is providing suspect statistics (for example, at the upper 20th centile); our further
investigations revealed that the exclusion of CIS countries (former Soviet Union) { some of which
have small negative or even positive NFA positions { eliminates this feature of the data completely.
We conclude that countries that have a high ratio of liquid indebtedness/GDP provided, in
contrast to others, balance of payments data which had an unusual distribution.
We do not get consistent (i.e., in terms of the observed patterns) and strong results for groups
of countries created using other measures of investment positions. In particular, for the full sample
we obtain rejections of Benford's distribution of the rst digits also for countries with the highest
net foreign asset position and the lowest liabilities/GDP, although we get similar results as for
countries with net foreign assets (excluding FDI) for the stable sample.24 These series may be less
pertinent for our tests. For example, the fact that a country has a high total liability/GDP ratio,
like Switzerland, may not per se be an indicator that a country is vulnerable if it is has high assets
as well. It may also mean that we cannot condition the data well enough, for example we do not
control for many features of countries (like dierences in technology) which may aect the payos
from misreporting. The data on liabilities may not be free of errors as well; and it is data that we
have on a yearly basis only. Therefore, if the dataset heterogeneity is large, the picture may be
blurred with these less precise measures.
5.3 Countries with negative current account balances
We report in Tables XIV{XV the results of tests for countries with negative current account
positions in a given quarter.
The evidence here is weaker than in the case of countries with xed exchange regimes. By taking
into account the P{values and the 1-in-10 criterion we observe that in both the full (P{value of
5:6% and 1-in-10 criterion indicating rejection at less than a 2% signicance level) and the stable
sample (P{value of 0:2% and 1-in-10 criterion at a 1% signicance level) we obtain a rejection
of the conformity of the rst digits of the balance of payments data to Benford's distribution for
countries that have negative current account positions in a given quarter. 99 out of 103 countries at
some point in time have a negative current account gure (63 out of 66 for the stable sample); this
shows that the rejection of this condition is not due to some country-specic data dissemination
practices but rather to what is reported when the country in question is borrowing from the rest of
the world in a quarter. If we include only the non-OECD countries, this picture is even stronger.
The same is true when we additionally select countries with the highest level of net indebted-
24Available upon request.
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ness or highest liabilities that are running negative current accounts. The only exception are the
countries with the highest equity/GDP liabilities for the full sample, where we cannot reject the
null hypothesis at conventional values.
The robustness tests are presented in Tables XVI{XVII. They raise a couple of question marks
about the robustness of some of our ndings. For the main condition { negative current account
position in a quarter { after excluding countries one-by-one from the sample we cannot reject
Benford's distribution for the rst digits of the data for the full sample, but we can do so for
the stable sample. For the complement of the above conditions, we can reject the null hypothesis
at a 5% signicance level for the full sample, but this rejection is mostly driven by data from
one country only. It seems that some additional conditioning (for example, choosing countries
with high total foreign liabilities/GDP or liabilities/GDP ratios) have in fact little importance in
characterizing countries with unusual rst-digit distributions, as we reject the null hypothesis for
the complement of the set. The less persistent series for the full sample for all categories seem
to conform to Benford's distribution, which is not the case for the stable sample, for which some
rejections of the null hypothesis on all series are conrmed. What is also important, we reject the
null hypothesis unequivocally for countries with negative current account balances that also have
lower liquid net foreign assets (i.e., NFA excluding FDI) for either of the samples.
Overall, the rejections we nd seem to indicate that countries requiring the nancing of their
borrowing (as their current account balances are negative) may be willing to misinform investors,
especially among the countries in the stable sample.
We obtained no consistent results when the scope of the current account position was taken
under scrutiny (akin to the exercise in Section 5.2). The dierence is, however, that we could
obtain current account/GDP gures on a yearly basis only whereas above we could investigate
quarterly evidence based just on the sign of the current account balance.
5.4 Crisis time evidence
Our model tells us that the urge to misinform investors would be higher in the time when many
countries have bad states of productivity or, in other words, during a world crisis. To investigate
this, we use the stable sample and yearly data, because we want to have globally roughly the same
number of observations for each studied time period. We are more constrained here in the number
of available observations and the conditions that we impose on the data than in the case of other
tests. We believe on the other hand, however, that persistence is not of a problem in these tests
as the number of consecutive quarters is small but many countries are involved (cf. Section 4.3.1).
An important issue is to determine time periods when there would be a time of a crisis touching
a wide group of countries so that our statistical procedure may have a chance to detect some
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deviations. There is no easy way to determine and dene \crisis" years, although recent attempts
were made for example in Reinhart and Rogo (2009) and Barro and Urs ua (2009). In the time
period 1995{2007 Reinhart and Rogo (2009) claim that there was one global nancial crisis in
the years 1997{1998 that originated in Asia and then spread across the globe. We present thus the
evidence for 1997 in Table XVIII. No results were found for 1998. An interpretation of this may be
that in 1998 it was already clear that the crisis is going to aect many countries; the possibilities
of misinforming investors were thus lower. We note that the last balance of payments gures for
the last quarter of 1997 were published in early 1998, so any deliberate alterations might be in part
driven by the events in early 1998. Therefore the data for 1997 in fact covers well the rst part of
the global crisis of 1997{1998.
The evidence for 1997 shows that countries open to capital ows (also those with lower net
foreign assets, higher total liabilities and with xed exchange rates) have rejections of Benford's
distribution for their rst-digit data at levels lower than a 5% level. This is what we would expect
for our model in Section 2: the benet of embellishing statistics would be higher when many
countries would be in a bad state of the world, and for those that would be open to capital ows.
We consider these results encouraging, but similar patterns appear for many categories for 1996
and 2006; without comprehensive further research it is dicult to determine whether these were
years with large shocks to many countries across the world that would cause such rejections. 25; 26
5.5 Quality of institutions and data provision
We also study whether institutional quality aects the truthfulness of data provided. For this
purpose, we use various World Governance Indicators from the World Bank and report the results
in Table XIX (main results for all indicators) and Table XX (main results and robustness checks only
for the corruption indicator). Detailed tables with robustness checks computed for all indicators
are omitted from the main text but are available upon request.
Both the P{values from the goodness of t tests and the 1-in-10 criterion indicate that coun-
tries ranked below the 50th percentile (and below the 25th as well) in the WGI dataset in terms
of corruption, political stability and the rule of law and below the 25th percentile in terms of gov-
ernment eectiveness (in terms of the global WGI dataset) exhibit balance of payments data with
rst digits that have non-Benford behavior. It appears thus that countries with poor institutions
25Inspecting for example global stock market indexes for emerging markets one can observe substantial falls (of
over 20% over some periods) in 2006. But this does not indicate how many countries were implicated and whether
this would in fact constitute a global and substantial shock.
26We do not investigate quarterly data; the reason for this is threefold. First of all, we have relatively few obser-
vations for each quarter. Secondly, any way of creating additional groups is going to yield even fewer observations.
Not less importantly, it is dicult to know when the results for a given quarter were published. It may well be that
the same underlying data would be reported dierently if the following quarter (or quarters, depending on the time
it takes for a country to publish data) were characterized for example by turbulence in the nancial markets or not.
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provide data of low quality. This is a nding similar to Nye and Moul (2007) who show that in
samples of economic data from the Penn World Tables for non-OECD countries the hypothesis of
Benford's distribution of the rst digits is rejected (but remember that for our BOPS data this
is not the case for the non-OECD countries, as witnessed by Table III). For rankings in terms of
voice and accountability and regulatory quality we obtained no consistent and interesting results.
For all the categories agged above the rejection of Benford's distribution for the complement of
the set (i.e., for countries with better institutional rankings) of the rst-digits fails. The exclusion
of one of the countries from the samples does not drive the results mentioned above, except for
the lower 25th percentile of government eectiveness on the stable sample. For tests ran on less
persistent series, we can reject Benford's distribution at the 10% signicance level for the countries
ranking lowest 25% in terms of government eectiveness and political stability for both samples,
and for those ranking most corrupt for the stable sample; the evidence based on these is weak.
The 1-in-20 and 1-in-5 criteria give rejections for the same categories, albeit sometimes at dierent
conventionally accepted signicance levels, as the 1-in-10 criterion.
Our results lead us to believe that countries with poor institutions produce balance of payments
data of questionable quality. However, we do not have a story why such countries would manipulate
the data. The answer may be that is not due to bad data collection procedures or methodologies.
Firstly, even high measurement errors should in practice cause the data to have rst digits obeying
Benford's law if the errors are well behaved, in view of the theoretical foundation F1. Secondly,
when we look at the tests based on the less persistent series, there is hardly any evidence that
countries with bad institutions do have weird rst-digit distributions. If the rejection of Benford's
distribution would be caused by bad data collection, the rst-digit distribution of the less persistent
series should be also aected. A better story may be that the institutions in these countries
have lower scruples or fewer control mechanisms (so that rightly they are ranked as having bad
institutional quality) that prevent data falsication.
5.6 Geographical groups
The goodness-of-t tests of conformity of the rst-digit distributions with Benford's distribution
broken down geographically are shown in Table XXI (main results and robustness checks). Here
we need to rely heavily on the 1-in-10 criterion as the persistence issue may be severe. We nd
that countries in Africa and the Middle East (grouped together in order to have a sucient large
number of observations) have suspect distributions of the rst digits both in the full and the stable
samples. Latin American countries in the stable sample, i.e., that provided data at least every
year between 1995 and 2007, also have a distribution of rst digits for which we can reject the
hypothesis that it was drawn from a Benford's distribution. The 1-in-10 criterion ags also the
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rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% for the stable sample and at 10% for the full sample for East
European countries. These ndings should be taken with caution, however, as there are relatively
few countries in each group with many quarters of data each, which may make rejecting the null
hypothesis easier (see Section 4.3 for discussion). Tests on the least persistent series do not conrm
any of the ndings. This may mean that it so happens that African, Middle Eastern and Latin
American (and potentially East European) countries have some economic series whose rst digits
are very persistent (i.e., evolve slowly) when termed in U.S. dollars, and these drive the rejections
of Benford's distribution. It may not be a primary feature of these countries that they provide bad
quality data on purpose.27
5.7 Other conditions for dening the subsets of the data
We have tried various other conditioning of the data in our search of unusual reporting patterns.
First of all, we studied (akin to Section 5.2) whether countries with more capital openness
(dened as high foreign equity liabilities/GDP ratios) exhibit non-Benford distribution of their
rst digits of the balance of payments data. Scrutinizing the tails of data sorted according to this
measure, we nd no results that this is the case.
Next, for countries that joined the Euro zone we inspected a period in which they had to main-
tain a xed exchange rate regime and satisfy certain economic performance criteria for admission.
We do not nd any evidence that the balance of payments data is unusual for up to 5 years prior
to joining the zone.
We also investigated countries with episodes of sovereign default and banking crises (data on
their timing obtained from Reinhart and Rogo [2009]). For countries that defaulted on their
sovereign debt within our sample period, we do not nd rejections of the null hypothesis either
for one, two or three year brackets preceding a default. However, we nd evidence that within
one year after enduring banking crises countries report suspicious distributions of the balance of
payments data. For these, we can reject the hypothesis that the rst digits conform to Benford's
distribution at 0:2% with 5,094 observations on the full sample and 5:6% for the stable sample
(2,487 observations).
There seems not to be any evidence that countries suering substantial falls in their Institutional
Investor country credit ratings, either contemporaneous, lead or lagged, oer suspect statistics.
27This is also to be put in perspective with the results of Nye and Moul (2007) who indicate that imprecise
transformations of the data alter its quality while we suspect it might be only due to the more severe persistence of
data when termed in U.S. dollars.
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5.8 Summary of empirical results
We nd results that support the hypothesis that countries strategically provide manipulated data
to economic agents. We observe rejections of Benford's distribution for the rst digits of data
issued by groups of countries that on average are more vulnerable to high capital outows. These
rejections are rather category than country specic, as data from many countries for dierent
quarters enters dierent categories. To our surprise, we obtain the strongest (i.e., most robust)
results for countries with xed exchange rate regimes though we also nd that countries with
highest levels of net indebtedness and those that were running current account decits have rst
digits that have unusual, non-Benford distributions. These ndings conrm the viability of the
intuition developed by the simple model in Section 2. However, we do not nd general results
for countries that were de facto more open to capital ows. This may be due to the fact that
we are unable to capture the extent of their vulnerability very nely; but for some subgroups of
countries (for example those with xed exchange rate regimes and relatively high de facto openness)
we still get very strong rejections of the null hypothesis. We also nd weak crisis time evidence,
pointing that countries may engage in data falsication in stress times. The interesting nding on
the xed exchange rate regime countries may show that the public is more readily misinformed
by governments when there is a larger scope for misinformation { for example when the market
prices aggregating private information are missing. We nd also evidence that countries with weak
institutions provide data that are non-Benford distributed.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we took a glimpse at the dark side of the moon of government statistics. We conclude
that country{quarter pairs that correspond to economic situations in which countries would have
higher incentives to misinform investors lead indeed to dierent distributions of the corresponding
rst digits of the balance of payments data than Benford's distribution, while for other country{
quarter pairs the data conforms to this distribution. This may of course be because there is
a dierent underlying process that rules the generation of balance of payments distributions in
country{quarter pairs for vulnerable countries, which we think is unlikely. It may be, however,
due to a simple fact: such countries will falsify their balance of payments data in these quarters.
This partial evidence on the strategic character of misreporting points out that models in which
governments emit public signals (for example, the discussion on central bank transparency) should
seriously consider the possibility that this signal may be at times intentionally misleading. On the
policy side, this paper calls for the need to establish independent statistical agencies akin to that
of independent central bankers. Some countries that failed in having such an independent agency,
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like Argentina or Greece, were caught red handed in altering economic data that they disseminated
to the public. The possible welfare implications of misinformation should also be investigated; the
actions of Argentina or Greece show that economic gains to governments, even if short-run, may
exist and be substantial.
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Newspaper articles
Financial Times (2001, via FT.Com). R. Bream, J. Blitz and P. Norman.\Doubts over way Italy qualied
for euro." 4 November 2001.
Financial Times (2006). Christopher Condon. \The Speech that sparked rioting." 20 September 2006.
Financial Times (2007). Stefan Wagstyl. \Lies haunt a reformer's grip on power." 25 October 2007.
Financial Times (2008). J. Webber. \As prices surge, Argentines cry foul over the ocial gures." 9 June
2008.
Financial Times (2009). Bernie McSherry. \Investors have to be sure that statistics do not lie." 16 July
2009.
Financial Times (2010). T. Barber and K. Hope. \Brussels attacks Greece over false data." 13 January
2010.
The Wall Street Journal (2004). J. W. Miller. \Obscure EU statistics bureau may be getting a higher
prole." 10 November 2004.
The Wall Street Journal (2008, online version). M. O'Grady. \Argentina Impoverishes Itself Again; What
happens when government meddles with private wealth." 3 November 2008.
Tomasz Michalski and Gilles Stoltz 37Do countries falsify economic data strategically? Some evidence that they do.
A Countries included in the study
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland,
France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, In-
donesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazachstan, Korea, Kirghiz Republic, Laos, Latvia,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macedonia (former Yugoslav Republic of), Madagascar, Malaysia,
Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan,
Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen (Republic of), Zimbabwe
B Proof of Proposition 1






















where the rst inequality is an equality if and only if n0(h) = 0, whereas the second one is an









(and omit the indexation of  in n0(h) for the sake of simplicity).






























































and LN+1 = 1 while
 2 (0;1). The nal inequality indicating that the dierence of payos is positive comes by function
study. To show that the function t 2 (0;1) 7! (1   )(1   t) + t(1   t 1) = 1      t + t is
38 Tomasz Michalski and Gilles StoltzDo countries falsify economic data strategically? Some evidence that they do.
positive for all  2 (0;1) it suces to note that it tends to 0 as t ! 1 and that its derivative with
respect to t equals (1   t 1) < 0.
C Tables and gures
They are reported in the following pages (one table per page).
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  5 
 
Proportion  
f = 5% 
Estimated quantiles (values given in %) 
90%  95%  98%  99% 
N = 2,500  5.3  5.7  6.2  6.5 
N = 5,000  6.2  6.7  7.5  7.8 
N = 10,000  6.3  6.7  7.4  7.9 
N = 30,000  6.3  6.7  7.2  7.6 
N = 50,000  6.2  6.6  7.2  7.6 
  Conclusion: upper bounds 






f = 10% 
Estimated quantiles (values given in %) 
90%  95%  98%  99% 
N = 1,200  5.5  6.3  7.2  8.0 
N = 2,000  7.0  7.9  9.1  9.5 
N = 5,000  6.9  7.8  9.0  9.8 
N = 10,000  6.9  7.5  8.7  9.9 
N = 30,000  6.8  7.5  8.7  9.5 
N = 50,000  6.8  7.7  9.0  9.7 
  Conclusion: upper bounds 






f = 20% 
Estimated quantiles (values given in %) 
90%  95%  98%  99% 
N = 1,000  8.7  10.4  12.8  14.2 
N = 2,000  8.2  9.3  11.6  13.2 
N = 5,000  8.2  10.5  13.4  14.5 
N = 10,000  8.5  10.2  12.6  14.3 
N = 30,000  8.6  10.9  13.0  14.1 
N = 50,000  8.4  9.7  11.8  13.3 
  Conclusion: upper bounds 
N ≥ 1,000  8.7  10.9  13.4  14.5 
 
 
Table V: Estimates of the quantiles of the distribution of the random variable RD;1000 when D is
chosen at random according to Benford's law and f equals 5% (top table), 10% (middle table), and
20% (bottom table); estimates were obtained by drawing D at random 1;000 times and computing
the associated values of RD;1000.
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